The Mystery of Evil. (Continued.) by Heyl, Paul R.
THE MYSTERY OF EVIL.
BY PAUL R. HEYL.
XL HISTORIC LITERARY SOLUTIONS.
While we have not yet considered all the fundamental positions
that may be taken with respect to the problem of evil, we have con-
sidered a sufficient number to enable us to analyze and classify most
of the complex attitudes usually assumed by those who discuss the
matter. As examples we shall consider two well-known pieces of
literature for both of which the mystery of evil furnishes the motive.
Each of these examples has been held by various persons to contain
a more or less complete and satisfactory solution of the mystery,
and it will be interesting for us to examine them at this point.
The Book of Job.—The first of these is the Book of Job. Mag-
nificent in imagery and diction, dramatic in style and setting, this
book is well worth attention simply as a piece of literature. Its
especial interest to us lies in the fact that the plot concerns itself
with the problem of the sufi^ering of the righteous. Job, a perfect
and upright man, one that feared God and eschewed evil, is suddenly
visited by great misfortune. The motive for this is disclosed to
the reader, but kept secret from Job and his friends. This motive,
naively anthropomorphic, originates in a dispute between God and
Satan relative to Job himself, Satan intimating that Job's righteous-
ness is but skin-deep. To refute Satan, God gives him power over
Job in all save his life, which power Satan promptly uses to Job's
great misery, first removing his children and possessions, and later
visiting Job himself with a loathsome disease. Under these afflic-
tions Job's attitude toward God is described as scrupulously correct.
"In all this Job sinned not, nor charged God foolishly."
Yet after seven days and nights of the silent sympathy of his
three friends Job breaks forth and curses, not God, but the day of
his birth. His friends listen silently to his invective, bitter, vehement,
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even majestic, and when he has finished begin an argument with him.
Their theory is simple : Job is a great sufferer ; he must therefore be
a great sinner. Here we have an ilkistration of what has been
discussed under the free-will position. Job meets this attack with
sound logic, pointing out the well-known fact that many wicked
persons escape punishment in this life, and defying his friends to
cite one instance of sin in his own career. This they are unable to
do. but are still unconvinced, and insist that Job must have sinned
in some manner unknown to him and them to bring all this terrible
punishment upon him. Both sides to the argument exhaust them-
selves fruitlessly. Finally God Himself speaks to Job in words of
unrivaled majesty. Surely, here we are coming to the solution of
the problem from the lips of the highest authority ! But no ; the
speeches of Yahveh are devoted to humbling Job by pointing out
his insignificance as compared with the Divine Majesty. Not once
does he deign to refer even remotely to the solution of the problem.
In common parlance. Job is subjected to the process known as
"roaring down," and so successfully that he ventures no further
word of complaint. In reward for Job's correct attitude throughout
his sufferings and in vindication of his claim of innocence. God re-
wards him with a prosperity many times that which had been ruth-
lessly taken from him. Job apparently forgets the past and all ends
happily.
Here we may see the argument of the Heavenly Reward in all
its simplicity. Job's children and cattle are sacrificed ruthlessly for
the greater glory of God. the confusion of Satan, and the ultimate
blessing of Job himself. Which of us would willingly accept future
happiness at such a price? And what force has the example of the
reward of one righteous man. brought about at the expense of. and
in contrast to. the suft'erings of others of his own family, who, so
far as we are informed, appear to have been righteous also? And
as to the ultimate good to be obtained by the confounding of Satan,
even this appears to have been but temporary, for centuries after
we are told that he goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he
may devour.
The Book of Job leaves the mystery of evil exactly where it
found it.
The Hermit and the Angel.—A monkish tale of the Middle
Ages, found in the Gesta Romanonim, and best known to moderns
by Parnell's versified form, tells the story of a hermit and an angel
who traveled together.
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"The angel was in human form and garb, but had told his
companion the secret of his exalted nature. Coming at nightfall to
a humble house by the wayside, the two travelers craved shelter
for the love of God. A dainty supper and a soft warm bed were
given them, and in the middle of the night the angel arose and
strangled the kind host's infant son, who was cjuietly sleeping in
his cradle. The good hermit was paralyzed with amazement and
horror, but dared not speak a word. The next night the two com-
rades were entertained at a fine mansion in the city, where the angel
stole the superb golden cup from which his host had cjuaffed wine
at dinner. Xext day, while crossing the bridge over a deep and rapid
stream, a pilgrim met the travelers. 'Canst thou show us, good
father,' said the angel, 'the way to the next town?' As the pilgrim
turned to point it out this terrible being caught him by the shoulder
and Rung him into the river to drown. 'Verily,' thought the poor
hermit, 'it is a devil that I have here with me, and all his works are
evil' ; but fear held his tongue, and the twain fared on their way
till the sun had set and snow began to fall, and the howling of
wolves was heard in the forest hard by. Presently the bright light
coming from a cheerful window gave hope of a welcome refuge;
but the surly master of the house turned the travelers away from
his door with curses and foul gibes. 'Yonder is my pigsty for dirty
vagrants like you.' So they passed that night among the swine
;
and in the morning the angel went to the house and thanked the
master for his hospitality, and gave him for a keepsake (thrifty
angel!) the stolen goblet. Then did the hermit's wrath and disgust
overcome his fears, and he loudly upbraided his companion. 'Get
thee gone, wretched spirit!' he cried. 'I will have no more of thee.
Thou pretendest to be a messenger from Heaven, yet thou requitest
good with evil and evil with good !' Then did the angel look upon
him with infinite compassion in his eyes. 'Listen,' said he, 'short-
sighted mortal. The birth of that infant son had made the father
covetous, breaking God's commandments in order to heap up treas-
ures which the boy, if he had lived, would have wasted in idle
debauchery. By my act, which seemed so cruel, I saved both parent
and child. The owner of the goblet had once been abstemious, but
was fast becoming a sot ; the loss of his cup has set him thinking,
and he will mend his ways. The ])oor pilgrim, unknown to himself,
was about to commit a mortal sin, when I interfered and sent his
unsullied soul to Heaven. As for the wretch who drove God's
children from his door, he is, indeed, pleased for the moment with
the bauble I left in his hands; but hereafter he will burn in Hell."
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So spoke the angel : and when he had heard these words the hermit
bowed his venerable head and murmured, 'Forgive me. Lord, that
in my ignorance T misjudged thee.' "^
It may be admitted at once that had the angel been merely an
omniscient and benevolent human, lacking omnipotence, he might
have been exp'^-cted to act very much as he did : but to explain in
this way the mystery of evil is to adopt the Solution by Retreat,
yielding the omnipotence to save the benevolence. The doctrine of
the Heavenly Reward also runs through the story ; each incident is
justified by a reference to a future of reward and retribution, wdien
eternal justice, at present in abeyance, shall finallv triumph and reign
for av. As a solution of the mystery of evil it is disappointing; and
not the least surprising thing in this connection is that it should be
cited with such approval bv ^Ir. Fiske. who elsewhere was clear-
sighted enough to see that "the more closelv we invite a comparison
between divine and human methods of working, the more do we
close up the onlv outlet. '"°
XTT. THE ATHEIST'S POSITION.
Rcturniup- now to the consideration of the different positions
that mav be taken with respect to the mystery of evil, we have yet
to consider several important ones. The first is the atheistic posi-
tion.
The atheist, confronted by this mystery, cuts the Gordian knot.
While the theist puzzles his brains over the tangle, the atheist looks
pityingly on. "Poor fool !" he says. "Poor fool ! You have per-
suaded yourself that there is a God both omnipotent and benevolent,
and when nature shows you clearly that these attributes are inconsis-
tent you still cling to vour fancied deity, and cudgel your brains to
find a reconciliation !"^°
^ Fiske, Through Nature to God, pp. 43f.
9 Fiske. The Idea of God. p. 123.
1° The position assumed by the agnostic must be carefully distinguished
from that taken by the atheist. The latter holds, at least, a definite and positive
opinion, while the former maintains that on certain questions we have not evi-
dence enough to warrant definite conclusions, and consequently assumes an atti-
tude of suspended judgment. There are cosmic problems of such nature as to
justify this attitude, but the object of the present argument is to show that
the problem of evil is capable of a definite analysis, resulting in a choice of
alternatives with no middle ground Csee below, "Striking the Balance"). If
this be true there remains no excuse for an agnostic attitude toward this par-
ticular problem. Such a position, in the face of the evidence, would be simplv
a refusal to think at all.
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XIII. THE THEIST'S ANSWER (1).
The atheist cuts deep at the root of the matter, and the question
he raises must be squarely met and fairly answered. As best repre-
senting modern rationalistic theism we shall present two answers,
made, not by professional theologians, but by scholars who hold
no brief for God, and are free from any temptation to special plead-
ing : answers which are the fruit of ripe scholarship and much
thought. In these answers rationalistic theism may fairly be said
to put its best forward.
The first of these is the answer of John Fiske. a theist of the
modern scientific type, who recognizes all that logic and sentiment
demand of God ; who is broadly enough acquainted with nature's
wonders (and horrors) to recognize how inconsistent is such a con-
ception of Deity, but who is thoroughly at a loss to answer the
atheist. Yet he replies, and what does he say?
"The only avenue of escape is the assumption of an inscrutable
mystery which would contain the solution of the problem if the
human intellect could only penetrate so far ; and the more closely
we invite a comparison between divine and human methods of
working the more do we close up that only outlet."*
This is not an agnostic attitude, as it definitely postulates a
God both omnipotent and benevolent, and clings to the conception
under heavy fire, repeating in answer to all arguments: "Though
He slay me, yet will I trust in Him !" In this answer Mr. Fiske
speaks for multitudes of others who probably could not give as good
a reason as he for the faith that is in them. It is well worth our
while to examine, broadly and generally, the foundations of a faith
which can make so brave an answer.
XIV. THE THEISTIC FOUNDATION.
There is much about Mr. Fiske's answer which suggests Her-
bert Spencer and his famous doctrine of the Unknowable. It is not
without significance in this connection that Fiske, who was prob-
ably the leading exponent of this type of scientific theism, and from
whom the foregoing answer has been quoted, was the chief apostle
of the Spencerian philosophy in America. In fact, to paraphrase
Matthew Arnold, we might say that on this point Fiske is but Spen-
cer touched with emotion. And it may well be that emotion or senti-
ment figures with most persons more largely than is consciously
recognized as a reason for belief in God.
* Fiske, ibid., p. 123.
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Human Need.—Instead of this faith being founded upon a rock,
so that the gates of Hell may not prevail against it, it may to a great
'extent be rooted, not in strength, but in human weakness, born of
an imperious human need, of a feeling that without some such faith
the ills of life would be too great to be borne. As evidence on this
point witness the tenor of hundreds of hymns, some of them ex-
quisitely beautiful, sung fervently by millions of devout souls
throughout Christendom
:
"Abide with me from morn till eve,
For without Thee I cannot live
!
Abide with me when night is nigh,
For without Thee I dare not die."
"But," says one, "is not this imperious human need to a certain
extent presumptive evidence in itself of the existence of something
which would satisfy it?" There is no more imperious human need
than the craving of the habitue for opiuiu." Even the craving for
alcohol cannot match it. And yet no one claims that this craving
is the expression of a natural and proper physiological need, such
as hunger. It is simply a vicious and deeply rooted habit, and life
may be perfectly happy without it. In an unused limb the muscles
atrophy until they are no longer able to bear the weight of the body
;
so it may be spiritually. Ages and generations of delusion may so
weaken the spirit that it cannot sustain the loss of its cherished
beliefs. To show that this craving is not a normal and indispensable
matter like hunger, it is necessary to show that human life may be
normal and happy without it. To this point we will return in the
section on "Atheism at Its Best."
Revelation.—There have been those, mostly in past ages, who
have based their belief in God upon an alleged personal revelation
of Himself to them. Such was the case with Saul of Tarsus, than
whom, after his conversion, there was none more zealous in the
King's business. Such also, according to the old legend, was the
11 Ross, The Changing CJiimse, pp. 161-162. Speaking of the enforcement
of the anti-opium edict among office-holders, he says : "The suspect was
obliged to submit himself to a rigid test. After being searched for concealed
opium he was locked up for three days.... and supplied with good food but
no opium. If he held out he was given a clean bill of health, for no opium
smoker can endure three days' separation from his pipe. The strongest reso-
lution breaks down under the intolerable craving that recurs each day at the
hour sacred to the pipe. Regardless of ruin to his career the secret smoker,
be he even a viceroy or a minister, will on bended knees with tears streaming
down his cheeks beg the attendant to relieve his agonies by supplying him with
the materials for a soothing smoke. Certain highnesses, princes of the blood
even, were by this means literally 'smoked out' and summarily cashiered."
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case with the Emperor Constantine when he saw the vision of the
flaming- cross in the noonday sky. In modern times, however, such
claims have fallen for the most part on incredulous ears.
Intuition.—We may pass with brief consideration those believers
with whom assertion is equivalent to proof, and who rely on intui-
tion for their belief in God. "I know that my Redeemer liveth."
Such may be classified properly among those whose faith arises
from human need and weakness.
Arciiimcnt from Design.—Turning now to those who base their
faith upon ratiocination, we have first the famous Argument from
Design. This is as old as the Psalmist, to whom the heavens declared
the glory of God and the firmament showed His handiwork. More
especially is this argument connected in later days with the name
of Paley, whose Natural Theology gave it the vogue that it enjoyed
in the early part of the nineteenth century. Briefly summarized,
the argument is that "there exists" a "necessity. . . .of an intelligent,
desig-ning mind for the contriving and determining of the forms
which organized bodies bear." Suppose, says Paley, one should
find in a desert place a watch; would it not be conclusive evidence
that a man had been there before him?
The argument is an excellent one, but the trouble with those
who use it is that they do not push it far enough. Suppose, after
finding the watch, we look farther and find a kit of burglar's tools
;
there is no doubt that a man has been there before us, but what
sort of a man?
The Argument from Design is of fundamental philosophical im-
portance in that it must be reckoned with in considering any and
every other argument for God that can be put forward, be it as
subtle as that of Descartes, or as naive as that of the intuitionalist.
The essence of the argument is that Creation is plainly the result
of a designing mind : but it must be remembered that the nature of
this mind, if it exists, is to be judged by the nature of all of its
works, both good and bad. Christian apologists have not always
obeyed this canon, marshaling usually only such arguments as tend
to show that the mind presumed to be responsible for the order of
nature is altogether of an admirable type. Yet there is another class
of evidence concerning which little is usually said, but which is en-
titled to equal consideration. The repulsive nature of much of this
complementary class of evidence must be admitted, but it has its
necessary place in any complete discussion of the problem of evil.
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For a lack of acquaintance with it many fail to appreciate the
gravity of the problem, and by a recognition of its co-equality in
importance a far-reaching line of argument is opened to us ; for in
the light of this evidence the Argument from Design, far from being
purely a theistic argument in itself, is seen to be a most searching
criticism of all other theistic arguments. For example, it is often
said that the existence of law in nature implies a Lawgiver. Well
and good: but what kind of a lawgiver? Man has long since
abolished attaint, but nature still visits the sins of the fathers upon
the children ; human law no longer countenances the rack, but
tetanus still tears the muscles of its victims from their very fasten-
ings; our law holds that it were better that nine guilty should
escape than that one innocent should suffer, but nature's punish-
ments are distributed with the blind impartiality of chance. And
so with any argument for God that human ingenuity may propose
;
it must stand the merciless test of this rcductio ad absitrdinn.
Again, it is sometimes argued that the frequently remarkable
adaptation of living creatures tok their environment illustrates the
infinite wisdom that planned it. This argument is older than the
principle of evolution, but those who uphold it have been in no
wise disturbed by the advent of the latter principle, taking the ground
that God may achieve His ends equally well by evolution or by
special creation. In the domain of parasitism we meet examples
of the most perfect adaptation to environment ; but what an adap-
tation and what an environment ! The disgusting cycle of the. life
history of the tapeworm, through pig and man, is familiar to all.
Adaptation here is carried to such an extreme that a digestive sys-
tem, being unnecessary, has disappeared completely even in the
larval stage.
Among the crustaceans parasitism and degeneration probably
reach their greatest luxuriance. In the cirripeds, or barnacles, some
forms are doubly parasitic, the females upon the host and the male
upon the female. The male is very minute as compared to the female,
and is greatly degenerate as far as its brain, legs, and sense-organs
are concerned, but the digestive and reproductive systems are un-
impaired in function. ^-
Lest the free-will advocate should exonerate God from any
responsibility in these matters, we will choose our next illustrations
with special reference to this objection.
In human anatomy (Paley's especial mine of argtmient) we may
^-Darwin, A Monograph of the Cirripedia: The Lepadidce, pp. 55, 189,
207, 231, and especially summar\% p. 281.
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cite instances which it is only fair to interpret as showing care-
lessness or thoughtlessness on the part of the Designer. There is
the vermiform appendix, now a useless remnant, remaining in such
a position that it is always a potential and every once in so often
an actual source of danger. What estimate would be placed on the
intelligence of a factory superintendent who would allow a discarded
piece of machinery to remain in its place until natural decay re-
moved it?
Again, what would any rational man think of an artisan who
had constructed an intricate and valuable machine, requiring months
for its completion, and of such a nature that it would be ruined if
taken apart, and had then discovered that it could not pass the
doorway of the room in which it had been constructed, and that
the doorway could not be enlarged without seriously weakening
the building? A perfect parallel to this supposed case occurs occa-
sionally in obstetric practice. An expectant mother may be perfectly
normal in her and her husband's family history, with no reason to
foresee trouble, and yet the skull of the fetus may prove to be so
abnormally large that it cannot pass the opening provided for it by
nature. In such cases the attending physician may occasionally
find it necessary to resort to the revolting expedient of some form
of embryotomy of the living fetus, possibly decapitation or cranio-
clasm ; operations from the nature of which the mother-soul is
mercifully spared all knowledge. ^^
In the light of these illustrations the Argument from Design
may be recognized as a relentless rcductio ad absurdum which no
argument for God, of whatever nature, can escape. Granted that
for any reason at all there is a God, what is His nature? To this
question the problem of evil returns an unequivocal answer. Mr.
Fiske himself was perfectly aware of this. He says: "The very
success of the argument in showing the world to have been the
work of an intelligent Designer made it impossible to suppose that
Creator to be at once omnipotent and absolutely benevolent. For
nothing can be clearer than that nature is full of cruelty and mal-
13 It is admitted that such operations are rare to-day, much rarer than
even a decade ago ; and for this there is a reason which is directly in line with
the argument set forth in these pages. It is the increasing perfection of the
human physician. Abdominal surgery has become so safe that the once-
dreaded Cesarean section now furnishes an approved and desirable alternative
in such cases. Moreover, the modern practitioner would feel a keen sense of
culpability were he to allow a case under his care to proceed to such an ex-
treme for lack of timely interference on his part with nature. This practically
limits the occurrence of such cases to those instances where, through human
neglect, nature has been allowed to have her erratic way to the end of the
chapter.
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adaptation. In every part of the animal kingdom we find imple-
ments of torture surpassing in devilish ingenuity anything that was
ever seen in the dungeons of the Inquisition."^^ What then is the
basis for the brave answer of Air. Fiske?
Mr. Fiske's Argiiuicnt.—The advent of the principle of evolu-
tion introduced an argument for God which forms the basis for a
species of scientific theism of which Fiske was the leading exponent.
Briefly it is that we have discovered a dramatic tendency in the
universe, an orderly progression toward
"One far-off, divine event
To which the whole Creation moves."
And this goal appears to be one which we may reasonably
expect to find within our comprehension when finally reached. Fiske
regards this process as the working-out of a mighty teleology of
which our finite understandings can as yet fathom but the scantiest
rudiments. "Such a state of things." says he, "is theism. It rec-
ognizes an Omnipresent Energy which is none other than the living
God."i5
It is difficult for one not touched with emotion to the same
degree as Air. Fiske to distinguish clearly what is new in this argu-
ment. In so far as its conclusion is an induction from the facts
of nature, even from a strictly scientific view-point, it is nothing
but a new variety of the Argument from Design, and as such must
take cognizance of both kinds of evidence as to the nature of the
God it discovers. In so far as it looks to the future for compen-
sation for present evils, it shares the weakness of those who explain
the mystery of evil by the Heavenly Reward : and in so far as it
personifies energy it suggests human need and human weakness.
Stripped of the poetic beauty in which Mr. Fiske's splendid style
clothes it, what is there in the argument that has not been said,
and answered, before?
XV. THE THEIST'S ANSWER (2).
The second answer to the atheist which we shall discuss is that
of Professor Royce. Speaking of the problem of evil, or, as he
calls it, the problem of Job, he says
:
"Job's problem is, upon Job's presuppositions, simply and ab-
solutely insoluble. Grant Job's own presupposition that God is a
being other than this world, that He is the external creator and
ruler, and then all solutions fail. . . .The answer to Job is: God is
1* Fiske, The Idea of God, p. 121.
15 Fiske, ibid., Preface, p. xii.
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not in ultimate essence another being than yourself. He is the
Absolute Being. You truly are one with God, part of His Hfe. He
is the very soul of your soul. And here is the first truth: When
you suffer, your sufferings are God's sufferings, not His external
work, not His external penalty, not the fruit of His neglect, but
identically His own personal woe. In you God suffers, precisely as
you do, and has all your concern in overcoming this grief. . . .
"Why does God suffer?. . . .Because without suffering, without
ill God's life could not be perfected. This grief is not a
physical means to an external end. It is a logically necessary and
eternal constituent of the Divine life.... He chooses this because
He chooses His own perfect selfhood. He is perfect. His world
is the best possible world. "^''
Royce is not easy reading, at the best, and this is a hard saying.
It is clear that Royce, following Fiske,^' regards all the difficulty
as arising from a false conception of God as remote from Creation,
and considers the problem solvable if we regard Deity as immanent
in the world of phenomena. That he not only considers the prob-
lem solvable but actually solved on this basis appears from what he
says on the same question in another place:
"When once this comfort comes home to us, we can run and not
be weary, and walk and not faint. For our temporal life is the very
expression of the eternal triumph. "^^
We are not to suppose from the last sentence that Royce, like
Fiske, adopts the solution of the Heavenly Reward. He distinctly
disclaims this
:
"Yet never, at any instant of time, is this (God's) perfection
attained. It is present only to the consciousness that views the in-
finite totality of this very process of seeking."^^
Royce's position in this regard is probably best expressed by
the old line:
"Man never is, but always to be blest."
Just how the conflict between omnipotence and benevolence
is settled by supposing Deity immanent rather than remote is not
clearly made out. Fiske, who lays as much stress as Royce upon
the immanence of God, admits, as we have seen, that even on this
supposition "the only avenue of escape is the assumption of an
inscrutable mystery." There are indeed signs that Royce fails to
18 Royce, Studies of Good and Evil, p. 13.
1'^ Fiske, The Idea of God, Chapters V and VI.
18 Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. II, p. 411.
19 Royce, ihid., p. 420.
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measure up to the thunder of his index. The complete identi-
fication by Royce of God with the human soul amounts practically
to an apotheosis of the latter. Xow the human soul at its best is
worthy of profound respect, but it is far from possessing the quali-
fications necessary for a God. It is benevolent but not omnipotent.
Royce evidently recognizes the danger of thus falling into the Solu-
tion by Retreat, and in attempting to avoid it introduces the doctrine
of Contrast. "\A'ithout suffering. .. .God's life could not be per-
fected." And again he follows Leibniz in saying that this is "the
best possible world," a clear lapse, as we have earlier pointed out,
into an abandonment of omnipotence.
For the word God, wherever used by Royce, substitute "Human
Soul," and we have a picture easy to recognize and understand;
that of the struggle of the soul with sorrow and evil, the overcoming
of evil by good. In such a struggle the human soul commands our
respect and admiration, but only because it is not responsible for
the evils with which it has to struggle. Call it God, and the whole
setting changes. Is Royce's God responsible for the established
order of the universe? If not, let Him stand aside; our business
is with His master. If so, let Him stand forth and face, if He
dares, the outraged sense of justice, of mercy, of common decency
with which He has endowed His creatures.
XVI. STRIKING THE BALANCE.
Among these various attitudes that may be assumed in the face
of the mystery of evil, is there any refuge for the troubled soul?
Let us recapitulate. Man demands in his God both omnipotence
and benevolence, the first for logical and the second for sentimental
reasons. The free-will argument may explain as much of the con-
tradiction arising from these two incompatible attributes as may
be the result of personal sin, but is itself violently in conflict with
man's sense of justice, and consequently reducible to the second
Solution by Retreat, if it tries to go farther. The Solution by
Retreat either violates logic by yielding the attribute of omnipo-
tence or outrages sentiment by abandoning benevolence. This second
alternative, however, is perfectly logical. The agnostic, by assuming
an attitude of suspended judgment, leaves the problem where he
found it. The atheist cuts the Gordian knot by denying the postu-
late of a God. These are the only fundamental and independent
positions. All others may be reduced to these or to their combi-
nations.
The cynic's position is a corollary to the second Solution by
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Retreat. The doctrine of the Heavenly Re,ward and doctrine of the
Devil reduce either to the free-will position or to the Solution by
Retreat. The Christian Science position is the free-will position
in a purely mental setting. The doctrine of Contrast reverts to the
Solution by Retreat. All arguments for God, of whatever nature,
are subject to the reductio ad absurdinn of the Argument from
Design. Even the brave answer of Mr. Fiske to the atheist is based,
in its various aspects, upon the Argument from Design, upon the
Heavenly Reward, and upon sheer human need ; and Professor
Royce's God, if a God indeed He be, cannot escape responsibility
for the horrors of nature.
Where, then, is the troubled soul to find refuge? Much depends
on the mental bias. Those who rate sentiment above logic have
the greater freedom of choice ; but those who hold the opposite
view are limited to but two positions. It is obvious that the choice
lies, broadly speaking, between atheism and theism ; and the only
form of theism which satisfies logical considerations is the horrible
one which recognizes a God without benevolence.
Observe that our study of the problem of evil gives us no
evidence for or against either of these two positions, but merely
limits our choice. Both positions, as far as the problem of evil
is concerned, are equally logical and satisfactory, but between them
there can be no middle ground. The agnostic may say that he
cannot decide which ground to take, but that is a different matter.
If there be a God, His nature is definitely indicated by the problem
of evil : and if the agnostic thinks this far, he should, if a normal
being, be considerably assisted in making up his mind in the matter.
Granting that we could stifle our natural repugnance to a God
of this description, the question arises, Whence this repugnance?
Can ideals rise higher than their source? And if so, is not man,
by just so much, the superior of such a God? And if we grasp the
other horn of the dilemma, are we not met at once by the questions
whence? whither? and why? Is the universe incapable of rational
description? And if so, what are we strangers, with minds so out of
joint with it, doing in its midst? And yet, barren of promise of
comfort as this position seems to be, there are those who flee to it
as to a city of refuge from the dreadful figure that overshadows
the other ground. "Such a God," cried Ingersoll, "I hate with all
the earnestness of my being!"
Here forks the road, both ways seemingly losing themselves in
darkness.
[to be concluded.]
